Chair,

I congratulate you on your appointment as Chair of this Committee and assure you of the full support of my delegation.

Germany fully aligns itself with the statement of the EU.

We meet in difficult times or – to quote the Secretary-General – during a “grave moment for international peace and security”.

While we debate matters of international security here at the United Nations, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues unabated and is now in its fifth year; at the same time, we have a fragile situation in the Middle East and two unsolved proliferation crises – Iran and the DPRK.

All these crises unfold at a time of deep mistrust among major powers and of rapid technological changes. Tension is rising around the globe.

Alongside, Artificial Intelligence comes around the corner and is challenging us across the board. It falls upon all of us to understand AI’s implications, also in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. I hope that this year’s First Committee will also offer an opportunity to gain greater understanding of the risks as well as opportunities associated with AI.

Nowhere else the world and governments come together closer to discuss these important issues than here in New York. We need strong international organizations, such as the UN, where – with respect and in a cooperative spirit – we discuss each other’s views and perspectives, search for common ground.

Germany is a strong supporter of UNGA’s First Committee, and where there is room to strengthen it and to make it more effective and efficient, we should discuss and engage. In this spirit, we are interested to receive further comments to the Franco-German Non-Paper on the 1C working methods we released at last year’s session.

Chair,

The multiple crises challenge the global arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament architecture:

It matters to all of us when a nuclear power plant is illegally seized in a conflict and nuclear safety and security are at risk.

It matters to all of us if two of our strongest and almost universal norms, the if the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention are blatantly violated.

It matters to all of us when aggressive nuclear rhetoric comes to the fore with the objective of deterring support for a country which was heinously attacked and invaded and is seeking to defend itself against foreign aggression.

Distinguished colleagues,

Iran and the DPRK represent two unresolved nuclear proliferation crises with no tangible progress over the last years.

Let us not forget that Iran’s nuclear ambitions lie at the origin of the massive military confrontation we witness today in the Middle East. And let us not forget that Iran had ample time to address open safeguards issues and to provide the world with credible assurances about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Unfortunately, Tehran has chosen another path, a path of confrontation and of non-compliance with the legitimate demands of the IAEA and the international community.

This is why the dossier is now with the UN Security Council. We call on Iran to urgently change course, to return to compliance with its legally binding obligations and to address the international community’s concerns about its nuclear activities.

The DPRK, likewise, shows no willingness to comply with its international obligations regarding its nuclear and ballistic missile program. Even worse, DPRK’s illegal weapons programs have been benefitting from Russia’s political cover and technological assistance, in blatant violation of numerous UN Security Council Resolutions, which demand the complete, verifiable and irreversible termination of all nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the DPRK. Let us not forget, that all these UNSC resolutions remain in force and that Russia – a permanent member of the Council – agreed to these resolutions.

These two proliferation crises in our view show that we must not gradually accept the situation as it is. On the contrary: They should make us firmer in our belief that existing arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and export controls instruments are worth fighting for – not just as a noble cause but as essential for our security.

Syria is a positive example where the nuclear file could be closed at this year’s IAEA Board of Governors. We are engaging with partners in helping destroy the remnants of the Assad Regime’s clandestine chemical weapons stocks.

We must stand up for the NPT, the CTBT, the BTWC, the CWC and all the instruments that make our world safer and our lives better.

While the Ottawa Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the PoA on SALW and the Arms Trade Treaty, remain cornerstones of the humanitarian and conventional arms control architecture, the Global Framework on Ammunition next year will hold its important first Meeting of States.

Germany remains a strong proponent of these instruments that show their relevance every day in preventing injury and death and in making the lives of millions safer.

Wherever possible, we need to improve existing instruments We hope that the CCW in November will be able to build on the consensus elements reached on LAWS at the GGE last month.

We hope that we can make further progress in universalizing the CTBT. We would welcome if countries, where seismic data suggest man-made explosions on a nuclear test site, chose to open up and actively and voluntarily engage to clarify the situation. As a ‘Friend of the CTBT’ Germany advocates for global adherence to the test ban norm. It makes our world safer and helps both our nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

In this vein, greater attention of us all is needed regarding a nuclear weapons state that (according to credible sources like SIPRI) is relentlessly increasing its arsenal by amassing roughly +100 warheads every year. Like many countries, we believe that greater transparency and dialogue, within the P5 and with NNWS of the NPT, would help avoid false assumptions and come to the right conclusions.

It is simple: Opaqueness makes our world less safe; transparency makes it safer.

With this, I wish us all a successful meeting here in New York.

Thank you very much!