I am delivering this statement on behalf of the ‘Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands.

We thank the President of the General Assembly for convening this meeting.

Eighty years have passed since the world witnessed the first nuclear test and in the decades that followed, more than 2000 tests took place. At the height of the Cold War, few would have believed it possible that in the 21st century, nations would come together to prevent another wave of testing. Yet we have. Today, looking back across those eight decades, we can say with confidence that the CTBT stands as one of the clearest demonstrations of what international cooperation can achieve.

The CTBT is a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The norm against nuclear testing is one of the most widely accepted and most effective contributions of the CTBT in countering nuclear proliferation, as well as in containing and reducing nuclear threats. Achieving a safer world without nuclear weapons begins with an effective, universal and verifiable commitment to a world free of nuclear testing – a world where everyone can be reassured that moratoria on nuclear tests are being maintained.

What makes the CTBT so successful is that it is not just a piece of paper. The CTBT is backed by the International Monitoring System (IMS), a truly global network reaching all the way to Antarctica that works every day, quietly and efficiently, to make sure no nuclear test explosion goes unnoticed. It is a transparent system, where every participating country sees the same data. That openness builds trust and makes it far harder for anyone to conduct a secret nuclear test. In an age where misinformation spreads faster than facts, the IMS gives us hard evidence that everyone can rely on.

It is worth noting that the monitoring system’s technical assets also have diverse scientific and civil applications that benefit all States, including monitoring nuclear accidents and detecting volcanic activity, earthquakes and tsunamis.

The CTBT has been instrumental in creating and promoting the global norm against nuclear testing. Its verification regime has so far successfully detected every declared nuclear test.

We recall our condemnation of the six nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK since 2006 and strongly urge the DPRK not to conduct further testing, fully comply with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and to take concrete actions towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons, ballistic missile and related programmes. We reiterate that any new DPRK nuclear test would be irresponsible, unacceptable and in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. We reaffirm that the DPRK cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT nor any special status of any kind. We call on the DPRK to sign and ratify the CTBT as a matter of priority.

Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call upon all States to declare or maintain their existing national moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, as an example of responsible international behavior that contributes to international peace and stability, and to refrain from any action that would undermine the Treaty’s objective and purpose.

Eighty years after the first nuclear test, it is worth remembering that we did not get here by chance. Maintaining the IMS has required steady commitment, resources, and consistent technical upkeep. If we allow it to degrade, we risk undoing decades of progress and may have to rebuild capabilities that took years to develop. Eight decades on, the choice is clear: keep the system strong, reliable, and ready to detect nuclear tests, thereby strengthening the norm against testing. It is crucial that efforts to preserve and sustain this key asset commence without delay.

In this context, we stress the importance of individual States’ financial commitments and contributions by States Signatories to ensure the completion, maintenance and pending long-term sustainment of the IMS. We reaffirm our continued commitment for maintaining the long-term sustainability of all elements of the verification regime, pending the entry into force of the Treaty.

We look forward to the Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) in Namibia in 2026 and thank our Namibian colleagues for their readiness to host the exercise. The IFE will further strengthen the CTBTO’s on-site inspection capabilities as the ultimate verification measure once the Treaty enters into force.

We also applaud the persistent and impressive efforts of the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, Dr. Robert Floyd, and his team towards the universalization of the treaty.

Lastly, we would like to thank the Article XIV Coordinators, Sweden and the Philippines for their dedicated efforts. We look forward to the upcoming Article XIV Conference as an opportunity to advance our shared goal of bringing the Treaty into force.

The CTBT’s value is unquestionable and its successes are already visible. But we cannot take for granted the global norm against nuclear testing until it is legally binding. As such, we urge all States that have not already done so to sign and ratify the Treaty and particularly the now nine Annex 2 States and encourage States Signatories to support continued efforts to strengthen the Treaty and its verification regime, and to achieve its entry into force as soon as possible.

Thank you.