Chair,

Germany aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union and the positions of the NPDI regarding pillar two of the NPT.

We would like to emphasize a few points:

First of all: The NPT has been instrumental in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, its core mandate, for more than five decades.

There are no dozens of nuclear weapon states that some predicted in the 1960s. Instead, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons contributes greatly to security and stability everywhere in the world. And there is a vast and growing number of countries benefitting from the peaceful use of all nuclear applications. This has and will continue to improve the lives of millions of people .

In addition, the strong norm against nuclear testing through the CTBT contributed significantly to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.

Secondly: There exists a strong and highly capable IAEA, with an efficient and effective safeguards regime. The IAEA is indispensable in helping create the international trust that the NPT’s non-proliferation norm is adhered to.

On this note, Russia’s illegal war of aggression and the breach of the Budapest Memorandum it entailed pose direct threats to the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities, including Ukraine’s largest nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhya, and make the verification work of the IAEA more challenging. We commend the IAEA on doing an outstanding job under these difficult circumstances, both in the implementation of safeguards as well as in the support on nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.

Germany equally commends the IAEA for preparing for future tasks, including on work related to safeguarding SMRs. Adequate funding of the IAEA remains essential to maintain the highest nuclear safeguards, safety and security standards of existing and new technologies.

Germany strongly supports the IAEA’s work to advance nuclear safety and security and its safeguards and verification activities, both bilaterally – as the fourth largest contributor to the IAEA’s regular budget as well as to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund – and through its Support Programme for IAEA Safeguards as well as through the European Union.

Thirdly: This PrepCom should send a strong signal for the need to attain the highest possible verification standard within the NPT framework.

The full implementation and universalization of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) should be the bare minimum for all NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon StatesNWS.

We are convinced that the CSAs should be accompanied by the implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP), and that the combination of CSA and AP should become the verification standard of the 21^st century.

States with outdated versions of the Small Quantities Protocol should be encouraged to amend their Small Quantities Protocols or rescind them.

Fourthly: Despite the overall success of the NPT, DPRK’s illegal nuclear weapon ballistic missile programmes and the looming threat of a seventh nuclear test remain a big challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime that must continue to be met with strong consequences.

Moreover, Iran’s unconstrained expansion of its nuclear activities and its lack of readiness to resolve its unresolved safeguard issues have put another strain on the NPT.

On the Iranian nuclear program our goal remains to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Recent developments are not encouraging: over the last months, Iran has dramatically increased its uranium enrichment activities, in particular its enrichment of uranium to up to 60 %, which is a level unprecedented for a non-nuclear weapon state. At the same time, transparency vis-à-vis the IAEA has been further reduced to a point that the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge on Iran’s centrifuge program and several other aspects of Iran’s nuclear activities. Germany remains fully committed to a diplomatic pathway forward and welcomes the recent talks between the United States and Iran in this respect. We urge Iran to reverse this path, scale back its enrichment program, fully cooperate with IAEA inspectors and give credible assurances to the international community that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. On that matter, Iran could re-apply the Additional Protocol as a straight-forward confidence building measure.

Looking at DPRK, the development of its illegal nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs continues unabated despite numerous UN Security Council resolutions calling for the complete verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of these programs. We urge DPRK to comply with the NPT and IAEA Safeguards, and to sign and ratify the CTBT. Furthermore, we stress that – despite its ongoing violations of the NPT, the IAEA Safeguards and several UNSC Resolutions - the DPRK will never have any other status than that of an NPT Non-Nuclear Weapon State.

Fifth: On the Syrian case, a window of opportunity seems to be opening up: Germany looks forward to the IAEA’s analysis of samples taken at locations where undeclared nuclear activities took place in the past. We welcome the recent meeting by the DG with the Syrian government and look forward to further steps, such as the DG’s trip to Damascus. There is now an opportunity for Syria to engage with the IAEA and to fully comply with its safeguards obligations in order to resolve all outstanding issues.

Mr. Chair,

While the NPT was an overall success story in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, a number of non-proliferation challenges clearly stand out. We must be united in addressing these challenges, to preserve the centrality of the NPT within the non-proliferation regime and to create the best conditions to advance nuclear disarmament. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing, and as NPT Member states we should strive to succeed at both tasks, on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Thank you.