Mr. Chair,

Germany fully aligns itself with the statements made by the European Union and the Stockholm Initiative. Building on these, we would like to add the following points:

Mr Chair,

The NPT has succeeded in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It has reduced nuclear weapons arsenals by close to 90% from Cold War levels. In implementing NPT Article 6, a series of arms control agreements were put forward, such as the SALT, New START, and the US and RUS Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Those agreements were laying the foundation for significant reduction in the large stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, we hear the criticism that nuclear disarmament has stalled. New START, will expire in February of next year, with a difficult security environment for negotiations of a follow-on agreement, also given China’s reluctance to engage in transparency and dialogue about its fast-growing nuclear arsenal. China’s massive nuclear build-up runs counter to Art. 6 NPT.

Our path towards a safer world without nuclear weapons has become more and more difficult in face of Russia’s breaches of international law – including its war of aggression against Ukraine in blatant violation of the security assurances in the Budapest Memorandum, its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and its categorical rejection of arms control.

And to those of you who want to believe that nuclear extended deterrence and NATO’s nuclear sharing are the impediments to nuclear disarmament: NATO never stood in the way of nuclear disarmament and the major cuts in nuclear arsenals at the end of the Cold War. And they will certainly not stand in the way for future agreements.

Mr Chair,

Disarmament remains our shared, critical objective. But we need to embed it into the reality of the global security context. That does absolutely not mean to step away from commitments and obligations. Germany remains fully committed to the objectives and obligations under the NPT, including the decisions taken by NPT state parties in 1995, 2000 and 2010, and to our ultimate goal of a safe world without nuclear weapons. It is crucial during this critical period to defend and strengthen the treaty and to ensure its continued relevance. We need to do all we can to improve the conditions for nuclear disarmament.

A key priority to this end is risk reduction. Risk reduction is neither a substitute nor a prerequisite for nuclear disarmament. As outlined in our joint Working Paper of 17 NPT State Parties on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Conflict, risk reduction plays a fundamental role in reducing the risk that misunderstandings or miscalculations could lead to nuclear war. Implementing risk reduction measures requires political will, but can also be implemented while there is lack of trust between the relevant actors. In this regard, risk reduction measures may offer a good starting point in a tense security environment.

Another key priority is transparency. Transparency helps avoiding unlimited arms races. Transparency is a critical component of State parties’ confidence in the treaty and their ability to assess whether treaty obligations are met. To this end, we highly welcome the draft national reports and related side events offered by France and the United Kingdom.

Thirdly, we need to continue our preparatory work to lay the ground for disarmament negotiations when they become possible again. Here, verification is just one good example. Nuclear disarmament verification removes technical and procedural obstacles on the road to a nuclear weapon-free world. NPT Member States accumulated substantial knowledge and experience on nuclear disarmament verification. When a window of opportunity opens for bold disarmament steps, through our common knowledge on nuclear disarmament verification we can make these steps sustainable, robust and irreversible.

Mr Chair,

All these steps contribute to making the case for and lead towards disarmament. They may lay the foundation for future disarmament steps and for continuing the legacy of arms control treaties and nuclear reductions.

In closing, we underscore the importance that the New Start Treaty does not become the last treaty limiting strategic nuclear arsenals. We welcome President Trump’s offer to engage in nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China. We call on Russia and China to engage in such talks for the benefit of the whole NPT community and its shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Thank you.