Mr. Chair,

Germany wholeheartedly congratulates you on your chairmanship of this 3^rd NPT PrepCom – be assured of our full support.

Germany fully aligns itself with the statements made by the EU, the Stockholm Initiative and the NPDI. Building on these, I would like to emphasize on the following key points:

1) First: The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is not only the cornerstone of the international nuclear order – it is a near-universal global good which has contributed largely to international security and stability since its entry-into-force. Without the NPT, we can hardly imagine the severe security implications had an unhindered spread of nuclear weapons taken place throughout the last 50 years.

The NPT is a success story. We enjoy its benefits every day. Despite the ups and downs of various NPT Review Conferences, the NPT is still in place and works.

And I think we need to differentiate between a successful NPT as a treaty and a Review Process which has its own dynamics, advantages and shortcomings. That is why we promote continued work on Strengthening the Review Cycle.

2) My second point: Whenever there was shared political will, great achievements came about across all the three pillars of the NPT, to which Germany is fully committed to.

The NPT helped cut the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia by around 80 % after the end of the Cold War.

On the first and the second pillar, the CTBT saw its light in the mid-1990s. Albeit not yet in force, the CTBT’s strong norm against nuclear testing holds and remains largely uncontested with the only inglorious exception of the DPRK`s six nuclear tests in this century.

And there exists a strong and highly capable IAEA, with an efficient and effective safeguards regime.

Regarding the third pillar, a vast range of nuclear applications is of tremendous benefit for the lives of millions of people around the globe today, for example when we look at its medical applications.

3) Third: We can build on a strong NPT acquis which should encourage us to aim high in the run-up to the Review Conference.

This includes of course the 1995 Decisions, the 2000 13 Steps and the 2010 Action Plan. At the last NPT RevCon in 2022 all but one State Party reaffirmed this acquis.

What makes for a successful NPT PrepCom are meaningful discussions and substantive engagement. This will further shape the way that States parties will perceive, implement and politically prioritize the NPT, ideally leading to a consensus outcome document.

As a member of the Stockholm Initiative, the NPDI and of a multilateral group engaged in risk reduction, Germany will therefore continute to engage in this substantive discussion, providing Working Papers into the NPT cycle and thereby hopefully contributing to the development of concrete recommendations.

4) Fourth: The NPT does not exist in a vacuum. Its relevance, resilience, and challenges are deeply intertwined with the security dynamics of the world.

A strong focus must therefore be on countering nuclear non-proliferation: Germany, as part of the E3, has been active in nuclear diplomacy with Iran for 22 years by now, promoting a diplomatic way forward to address and stop those Iranian nuclear activities which clearly go beyond any plausible civilian nuclear purpose. We remain committed to diplomacy in reaching this objective, and call on Iran to do its part to remove all doubts about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and to address and resolve its open safeguards issues in close cooperation with the IAEA.

The DPRK‘s ongoing illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes must continue to meet our unequivocal rejection and strong response and we therefore fully subscribe to a statement submitted by France and South Korea on the DPRK challenge.

Russia’s actions in its war of aggression against Ukraine are reckless and despicable and have strongly impacted the field of arms control and non-proliferation.: Its nuclear threats are irresponsible, its seizure and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant endanger nuclear safety and security.

China has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal and is the only NWS to produce fissile material for weapon purposes. A rapidly growing nuclear arsenal is not in line with Art. VI of the NPT, even more so if it does not provide for any transparency and is not coupled with a willingness to engage in arms control and meaningful risk-reduction measures.

5) Fifth: While the focus on the core mission of the NPT, that is to prevent nuclear non-proliferation, is absolutely needed, our ambition must aim higher: We acknowledge President Trump’s interest in denuclearisation through further verifiable reductions of nuclear arsenals between the largest nuclear weapon states. A first positive step would be for Russia to return to full implementation of the New START treaty. But China must become part of the equation as well and open up to meaningful arms control talks with the United States

Transparency is also a key instrument in strengthening the disarmament pillar of the treaty and we do highly appreciate the transparency provided by France and the United Kingdom in terms of submitting their voluntary transparency reports ahead of this PrepCom.

6) Sixth: It is important to emphasize that NATO, including its nuclear-sharing arrangements, has largely contributed to stability, security and nuclear non-proliferation since its foundation.

Nuclear sharing arrangements have been in place during times of major progress in nuclear disarmament after the end of the Cold War and they would certainly not stand in the way for further progress.

7) My last point: While the security environment is deteriorating, we face new, so far unknown developments in the realms of outer space, cyber and Artificial Intelligence. While they undoubtedly pose risks – some of which we may not yet fully understand – they also offer opportunities. By harnessing these technologies, we can adapt, modernize, and perhaps even revolutionize arms control, laying a stronger foundation for future agreements. I invite all of you to take note of the Working Paper on “Navigating the potential impact of emerging technologies on nuclear disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation ” provided by the Stockholm-Initiative in this respect.

Distinguished chair, colleagues: Our task ahead is two-fold: to protect the NPT and the global non-proliferation regime at present and to look at ways at making it fit for new and emerging challenges to ensure its future relevance for a safer world for us and future generations.

Thank you!