Madam Chair,
Germany fully aligns itself with the statement of the EU.
Distinguished colleagues,
Last month the “Pact for the Future” was adopted, a historic achievement within the United Nations which we proudly facilitated, together with our Namibian partner. The Pact demonstrates: UN multilateralism works if we are all united in purpose! In light of today’s and tomorrow’s challenges in the world we need more – rather than less – of it.
We have to acknowledge: The challenges for arms control and disarmament are enormous. Russia’s all-out war of aggression against Ukraine, now in its third year, has accelerated the erosion of our arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.
The brutal reality is that the BTWC is under pressure by false allegations from Russia regarding the alleged development of biological weapons. But the vast majority of States want the BTWC strengthened and fit for the future - by adding a S&T and Cooperation and Assistance mechanism as well as by developing new approaches for verification elements. The CWC and its norms have to be upheld against concerning information from the battlefields in Ukraine regarding the use of riot control agents and other toxic chemicals by Russia, which represents a clear breach of the CWC. Russia’s use of APMs and Cluster munitions defy the Ottawa and the Oslo Conventions.
The NPT is under pressure – not only with proliferation cases such as DPRK’s and Iran’s nuclear programmes: In all its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric Russia has, in its latest move, declared the de-nuclearization of the DPRK a “closed issue”, defying its own obligation as a Nuclear Weapon State under the NPT to prevent nuclear proliferation. At the NPT PrepCom in August Russia flatly rejected any engagement in arms control or disarmament, despite its obligation under Art. VI NPT. With Russia being one of 5 Nuclear-Weapon-States under the NPT, one wonders: What political signal does this send to the world? In addition, Russia’s No to come back to strategic arms control with the United States risks leaving the world without any nuclear arms control in 2026 when the New START Treaty expires.
Having said that, when we look at China, we see a massive build-up of its nuclear arsenal with no transparency. This is the opposite of what Art. VI NPT calls for. And it raises many questions as to the plausibility of China’s purported “No First Use-doctrine” and how this can be consistent with a highly opaque and untransparent nuclear build-up. This is highly risky as it could give rise to misperceptions or miscalculations. Engagement in dialogue and credible risk-reduction measures would be the way forward.
This is why it would be so important that both Russia and China positively respond to the repeated US offer for talks on strategic stability and arms control: First, to reduce nuclear risk which is the responsibility of Nuclear Weapon States and second, to return, or – in the case of China – to start nuclear arms control with the United States and thereby do their part to prevent a new nuclear arms race.
But beyond the Nuclear Weapon States, it is our shared obligation to protect the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the international nuclear order. Even if the sky is grey, there is a lot we can do: First, focus on risk-reduction is a matter of urgency and Germany will be keen to continue this effort, building upon the Joint Statement on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Conflict that a group of states delivered to the last PrepCom.
Second, we will continue to push and make on the whole menu of positive concrete steps that we are already implementing or trying to advance: From finally beginning negotiation of an FMCT in the Conference to Disarmament, to putting new emphasis on Transparency of Nuclear Arsenals, in particular within the NPDI, or advancing Nuclear Disarmament Verification. The joint Brazilian-Norwegian resolution on nuclear disarmament verification which we support is a case point. Much of these efforts can be channeled or amplified through our cross-regional initiatives like the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, the NPDI, IPNDV or CEND. If we manage to follow the example of the Pact for the Future and join forces, progress on concrete and effective nuclear disarmament can be achieved. However, it requires all sides to be at the table, otherwise effects will be limited or none.
Distinguished colleagues, disarmament and arms control is hard work, which requires a clear-eyed vision and a long breath. On Outer Space, it is well known that we are a staunch supporter of the behaviour-based approach. The ASAT resolution 77/41 is an important step in this regard and we welcome the increasing number of commitments made so far by UN Member States. We would be supportive of the proposal to merge the two OEWGs mandated last year. However, a new resolution would have to ensure that both mandates are equally reflected, allowing for inclusive participation of all relevant stakeholders.
New technologies such as AI provide opportunities for our armed forces, but they also pose significant challenges to arms control. With regard to LAWS, we must all work towards enabling the GGE to accomplish its mandate and achieve tangible results in an inclusive manner.
To conclude, let me draw your attention to one resolution. Germany and France are seeking your support for preparing UNIDIR’s 45th anniversary next year. The resolution seeks to acknowledge its invaluable contribution and asks for recommendations from the SG to make its work more sustainable.
Madam Chair,
Germany is committed to FFP, and we are delighted to work with you as first female chair of the 1st Committee ever. That is almost unbelievable given the many female leaders and experts in arms control and non-proliferation, including in this distinguished group! The work ahead of us is more than challenging but we stand ready to engage with you to contribute to concrete and practical steps to promote disarmament and arms control.
Thank you!